hpe-edgeconnect-mcp
MCP server that exposes HPE Aruba EdgeConnect Orchestrator SD-WAN infrastructure as LLM-callable tools for listing appliances, reading interface/tunnel/bandwidth state, and changing HPE SSE tunnel state.
README
hpe-edgeconnect-mcp
An MCP server that exposes an HPE Aruba EdgeConnect Orchestrator as tools an LLM client can call — list appliances, read interface and tunnel state, pull WAN bandwidth time series, and check or change HPE SSE tunnel state.
It speaks MCP over Streamable HTTP, so it runs as its own service on the network rather than as a local subprocess of one client.
Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or supported by Hewlett Packard Enterprise. "HPE," "Aruba," "EdgeConnect," and "Silver Peak" are trademarks of their respective owners and are used here only to describe what this software talks to.
Read this before you point it at production
Two of the eleven tools change state, and this server does not ask before executing them. There is no preview, no confirmation, no dry-run. If a model decides to call one, it happens.
| Tool | What it does | Risk |
|---|---|---|
write_set_appliance_location |
Sets an appliance's address/contact metadata | Cosmetic. Reversible, traffic-neutral. |
write_set_appliance_sse_tunnel |
Enables/disables an appliance's HPE SSE IPsec tunnel(s) | Traffic-affecting on a live edge appliance. |
That second one deserves a straight description: disabling SSE for an appliance takes down all of its HPE SSE tunnels together (e.g. an A1 + A2 pair), and bringing them back is not instant — re-enabling kicks off an orchestration cycle, and tunnels have been observed taking 10–15 minutes to come back up. It is not an operation you want a model performing speculatively while it "investigates" something.
Two ways to handle that:
-
Scope the API key read-only. This is the real control, and it lives on the Orchestrator, not in this code. Give the API key a read-only role and the write tools fail at the API no matter what any model decides. Do this unless you specifically intend the writes to work.
-
Gate the writes in your client. Every state-changing tool is prefixed
write_. That prefix is a convention of this codebase precisely so a client can match on it and route those calls through a human-approval step before execution. This server deliberately doesn't do that itself — it has no user to ask.
The MCP endpoint has no authentication
This server exposes its tools to anyone who can reach its port. There is no token, no client auth, no TLS on the MCP side.
MCP_HOST defaults to 127.0.0.1 for that reason. The container image sets
0.0.0.0 because it has to, which means publishing the container's port puts
an unauthenticated control plane for your SD-WAN on that interface. Keep it
on an internal network with the client, or terminate TLS and authentication in
front of it.
Tools
Reads (9)
| Tool | Returns |
|---|---|
list_appliances |
All appliances the Orchestrator knows about. Each entry's id (e.g. 2.NE) is the nePk every other tool wants. |
get_appliance_status |
State, model, software version, reachability, reboot/unsaved-changes flags for one appliance. |
get_interfaces |
Interface and system state for one appliance. |
get_tunnel_status |
Physical/underlay tunnel operStatus/adminStatus, for one appliance or all. |
get_overlay_config |
The network-wide SD-WAN overlay configuration. |
get_appliance_groups |
The appliance group tree, as a flat list of nodes. |
get_wan_bandwidth_timeseries |
WAN bandwidth over time for one appliance, projected to the bandwidth-relevant fields and sorted oldest-first, with average bits/sec per interval. |
get_appliance_location |
The address/contact metadata currently stored for an appliance. |
get_appliance_sse_tunnel_status |
HPE SSE enrollment and live SSE tunnel state in one call. |
Writes (2) — write_set_appliance_location, write_set_appliance_sse_tunnel.
See the warning above.
A note on get_appliance_sse_tunnel_status, because it is the one place the
API is genuinely confusing: HPE SSE tunnels are pass-through tunnels, not
the physical/underlay tunnels get_tunnel_status reports. On a
single-appliance deployment get_tunnel_status returns empty regardless of SSE
state. Don't infer SSE health from it — that's what this tool is for.
Secret redaction
The Orchestrator returns secrets embedded in otherwise-useful objects — the
appliance list, for instance, carries device admin passwords in cleartext.
Every tool result is scrubbed before it leaves the server, replacing the value
of any sensitive-named field (password, psk, presharedkey,
snmpcommunity, token, …) with ***REDACTED***.
It's a denylist by exact field name, kept deliberately narrow to avoid
over-redacting benign fields like publicKey. If your Orchestrator version
returns a secret under a field name that isn't in _SENSITIVE_FIELDS in
server.py, it will pass through to the model. Worth a look before you trust
it with a large deployment.
Configuration
All configuration is environment variables.
| Variable | Required | Default | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
EDGECONNECT_BASE_URL |
yes | — | e.g. https://orchestrator.example.com |
EDGECONNECT_API_KEY |
yes | — | Sent as an X-Auth-Token header on every request. |
EDGECONNECT_VERIFY_TLS |
no | true |
Set false only for self-signed lab certs. |
MCP_HOST |
no | 127.0.0.1 |
0.0.0.0 in the container image. |
MCP_PORT |
no | 8000 |
8001 in the container image. |
Auth is stateless: no login call, no session cookie, no CSRF token. The key
goes in a header rather than the ?apiKey= query param the Orchestrator also
accepts — TLS protects both in transit, but query strings get written to proxy
and server access logs in cleartext.
Running it
Directly:
pip install -r requirements.txt
export EDGECONNECT_BASE_URL=https://orchestrator.example.com
export EDGECONNECT_API_KEY=...
python server.py
In Docker:
docker build -t hpe-edgeconnect-mcp .
docker run --rm -p 127.0.0.1:8001:8001 \
-e EDGECONNECT_BASE_URL=https://orchestrator.example.com \
-e EDGECONNECT_API_KEY=... \
hpe-edgeconnect-mcp
The MCP endpoint is at /mcp on that port. Note the 127.0.0.1: in the port
publish — see the authentication section above.
Checking it against your Orchestrator
test_client.py is a read-only smoke test that requires a live
Orchestrator — not a unit test, and it won't run without real gear. It
exercises every read method and prints what comes back:
export EDGECONNECT_BASE_URL=... EDGECONNECT_API_KEY=...
python test_client.py
Any block that prints an HTTP 4xx/5xx line means an endpoint path or the auth
constant needs adjusting for your Orchestrator version. It never calls a write
method, so it cannot change device state.
Compatibility
Endpoint paths and the nePk identifier were verified live against
Orchestrator v9.7.0.43266 and cross-checked against its OpenAPI spec. Other
versions will likely need path adjustments — they're all in
edgeconnect_client.py, which is a plain REST wrapper with no MCP dependency,
so it's straightforward to correct and to reuse outside MCP entirely.
One identifier gotcha that costs people time: the appliance-scoped endpoints
want the nePk — the id field from list_appliances, like 2.NE. They
reject the numeric applianceId field that appears alongside it.
License
Copyright 2026 Jason Anderson
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0. See LICENSE.
推荐服务器
Baidu Map
百度地图核心API现已全面兼容MCP协议,是国内首家兼容MCP协议的地图服务商。
Playwright MCP Server
一个模型上下文协议服务器,它使大型语言模型能够通过结构化的可访问性快照与网页进行交互,而无需视觉模型或屏幕截图。
Magic Component Platform (MCP)
一个由人工智能驱动的工具,可以从自然语言描述生成现代化的用户界面组件,并与流行的集成开发环境(IDE)集成,从而简化用户界面开发流程。
Audiense Insights MCP Server
通过模型上下文协议启用与 Audiense Insights 账户的交互,从而促进营销洞察和受众数据的提取和分析,包括人口统计信息、行为和影响者互动。
VeyraX
一个单一的 MCP 工具,连接你所有喜爱的工具:Gmail、日历以及其他 40 多个工具。
graphlit-mcp-server
模型上下文协议 (MCP) 服务器实现了 MCP 客户端与 Graphlit 服务之间的集成。 除了网络爬取之外,还可以将任何内容(从 Slack 到 Gmail 再到播客订阅源)导入到 Graphlit 项目中,然后从 MCP 客户端检索相关内容。
Kagi MCP Server
一个 MCP 服务器,集成了 Kagi 搜索功能和 Claude AI,使 Claude 能够在回答需要最新信息的问题时执行实时网络搜索。
e2b-mcp-server
使用 MCP 通过 e2b 运行代码。
Neon MCP Server
用于与 Neon 管理 API 和数据库交互的 MCP 服务器
Exa MCP Server
模型上下文协议(MCP)服务器允许像 Claude 这样的 AI 助手使用 Exa AI 搜索 API 进行网络搜索。这种设置允许 AI 模型以安全和受控的方式获取实时的网络信息。