mcp-gatehouse

<!-- mcp-name: io.github.nickgeorgeseo/gatehouse -->

Permission tiers, approval gates, and audit logging for MCP servers. The server is the gatekeeper: you decide what an AI can read, what it can write, and what's off-limits — and every action gets logged.

Most MCP servers hand the model every tool at full strength and keep no record of what it did. That's fine for a demo. It's not fine the day an agent has write access to your CRM, your books, or your order system. mcp-gatehouse is the missing gate, enforced inside the server — no proxy, no external policy service, no dependencies beyond the official mcp SDK.

pip install mcp-gatehouse

What you get

Permission tiers	Every tool is declared READ, WRITE, or DESTRUCTIVE — and the tier also emits honest spec ToolAnnotations (readOnlyHint / destructiveHint), which the wrapper won't let you override to lie.
Approval gates	Tiers you choose require a sign-off before the tool runs. Your approver is any callable — a terminal prompt, a Slack ping, a ticket. Fails closed: a gated tool with no approver configured is denied, not waved through.
Audit log	Append-only JSONL, one line per call — allowed, denied, or failed — with UTC timestamps and durations. The answer to "what did the AI actually do?" six months later.
Redaction	Argument keys you name (api_key, password, token, … by default) are masked before they reach the log or the approver.
Denylist	Block a tool outright, whatever its tier.

Quickstart

from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
from mcp_gatehouse import AccessTier, AuditLog, Gatehouse, Policy

mcp = FastMCP("order-desk")
gatehouse = Gatehouse(
    mcp,
    policy=Policy(approver=lambda req: input(f"allow {req.tool}? [y/N] ") == "y"),
    audit=AuditLog(path="audit.jsonl"),
)

@gatehouse.tool(tier=AccessTier.READ)
def lookup_order(order_id: str) -> str:
    """Look up an order's status."""
    ...

@gatehouse.tool(tier=AccessTier.DESTRUCTIVE)
def cancel_order(order_id: str) -> str:
    """Cancel an order. Runs only if the approver says yes."""
    ...

mcp.run()

That's the whole integration: build your FastMCP server exactly as the SDK docs show, but register tools through the gatehouse. Schema generation, transports, and everything else work unchanged — the guard preserves the function's signature.

Under the default policy, DESTRUCTIVE requires approval and everything is audited. Gate writes too with one line:

Policy(require_approval=frozenset({AccessTier.WRITE, AccessTier.DESTRUCTIVE}), ...)

What the audit trail looks like:

{"ts": "2026-07-16T14:02:11+00:00", "tool": "lookup_order", "tier": "read", "outcome": "ok", "arguments": {"order_id": "4417"}, "duration_ms": 0.42}
{"ts": "2026-07-16T14:02:38+00:00", "tool": "add_note", "tier": "write", "outcome": "ok", "arguments": {"order_id": "4417", "note": "call back", "api_key": "«redacted»"}, "duration_ms": 1.08}
{"ts": "2026-07-16T14:03:05+00:00", "tool": "cancel_order", "tier": "destructive", "outcome": "denied", "reason": "approver refused", "arguments": {"order_id": "4417"}}

Try the demo

The package ships a runnable order-desk server with all three tiers wired up and a terminal-prompt approver:

mcp-gatehouse-demo

Point any MCP client at it over stdio (Claude Desktop, etc.), ask the model to cancel an order, and watch the approval land in your terminal — and the verdict land in audit.jsonl either way. examples/orders_server.py is the same server as a copyable template.

Design notes

• Enforcement lives inside the server, at the tool boundary. A proxy can't see your tools' semantics, and a policy service is one more thing to deploy. A 40-person plant doesn't have a platform team; this is a few small classes and a JSONL file.
• Fail closed. Security defaults that quietly allow are worse than none. That includes redaction: argument values the scrubber can't take apart (arbitrary objects, bytes) are replaced with an opaque placeholder rather than passed through, and exception messages stay out of the log — only the exception type is recorded, because error text loves to embed the very values you just redacted.
• The audit log records denials and errors, not just successes — the calls that didn't happen are half the story.
• A blocking terminal approver and the stdio transport don't mix — stdout/stdin are the protocol pipe. The demo's approver prompts on /dev/tty for exactly that reason (and denies when no terminal exists). Real deployments should approve out-of-band: Slack, a ticket, a queue.
• What this is not: authentication, transport encryption, or a sandbox. It's a gate inside your server, not a perimeter around it. See SECURITY.md.

Compatibility

Targets the official mcp Python SDK v1.x (mcp>=1.27,<2) and Python 3.10+. When SDK v2 ships for the 2026-07-28 spec revision, a v2-compatible release will follow — the public API here (Gatehouse, Policy, AuditLog, AccessTier) will not change.

Who built this

Nick George — I design and run MCP servers in production for a mid-market reverse logistics-tech company, and build them for businesses at nickgeorgeai.com. This library is the permission-and-audit discipline from those builds, extracted.

If you're an owner or operator wondering what MCP even is, start with the plain-English guide: What is an MCP server?

License

MIT