SINT Protocol

Security, permission, and economic enforcement layer for physical AI.

SINT is the missing governance layer between AI agents and the physical world. Every tool call, robot command, and actuator movement flows through a single Policy Gateway that enforces capability-based permissions, graduated approval tiers, and tamper-evident audit logging.

Academic grounding: SINT is designed with reference to IEC 62443 FR1–FR7, EU AI Act Article 13, and NIST AI RMF. The evaluation framework references the ROSClaw empirical safety study (arXiv:2603.26997) and MCP security analysis (arXiv:2601.17549).

Agent ──► SINT Bridge ──► Policy Gateway ──► Allow / Deny / Escalate
                               │
                       Evidence Ledger (SHA-256 hash-chained)
                               │
                    ProofReceipt (pluggable attestation)

Why SINT?

AI agents can now control robots, execute code, move money, and operate machinery. But there's no standard security layer between "the LLM decided to do X" and "X happened in the physical world."

SINT vs. Other Frameworks

Capability	SINT Protocol	Microsoft AGT	MCP Baseline	SROS2
Physical constraint enforcement (velocity, force, geofence)	✅ In token	❌	❌	❌
Tier-based human oversight (T0–T3)	✅ 4-tier	⚠️ Execution rings	❌	❌
Append-only hash-chained audit	✅ SHA-256	⚠️ Logging	❌	❌
ROS 2 / MAVLink / industrial bridges	✅ 12 bridges	❌ Digital only	❌	⚠️ ROS only
OWASP ASI01–ASI10 coverage	✅ 10/10 Full	✅ 10/10	❌	❌
Economic routing + budgets	✅ bridge-economy	❌	❌	❌
Swarm collective constraints	✅ SwarmCoordinator	❌	❌	❌
E-stop / CircuitBreaker	✅ EU AI Act Art. 14	✅ Kill switch	❌	❌

SINT is the only framework purpose-built for physical AI — where actions are irreversible and have real-world consequences. Microsoft AGT targets digital/software agents; SINT targets robots, drones, and actuators.

The empirical case for SINT:

• ROSClaw (IROS 2026): Up to 4.8× spread in out-of-policy LLM action proposals across frontier models under identical safety envelopes. The 3.4× divergence between frontier backends is measurable, reproducible, and persistent.
• MCP security (arXiv:2601.17549): 10 documented real-world MCP breaches in under 8 months, including a CVSS 9.6 command injection affecting 437,000 downloads.
• SROS2: Formally demonstrated to contain 4 critical vulnerabilities at ACM CCS 2022, including access-control bypasses permitting arbitrary command injection.
• Unitree BLE worm (September 2025): Hardcoded crypto keys enabled wormable BLE/Wi-Fi command injection across robot fleets — precisely the scenario SINT's per-agent token scoping and real-time revocation prevent.

Core guarantees:

• No agent action ever bypasses the Policy Gateway (invariant I-G1: No Bypass)
• Every decision is recorded in a tamper-evident SHA-256 hash-chained ledger (invariant I-G3: Ledger Primacy)
• Physical constraints (velocity, force, geofence) are enforced at the protocol level — in the token, not in config
• Tier-gated verifiable compute hooks support provable-execution evidence on critical actions
• E-stop is universal across all non-terminal DFA states (invariant I-G2: E-stop Universality)
• Per-agent capability tokens with real-time revocation

Quick Start

# Prerequisites: Node.js >= 22, pnpm >= 9
pnpm install
pnpm run build
pnpm run test        # full workspace test suite

Start the Gateway Server

pnpm --filter @sint/gateway-server dev
# → http://localhost:3100/v1/health
# → http://localhost:3100/v1/ready
# → http://localhost:3100/v1/docs

Start Production-Like Stacks (One Command)

pnpm run stack:dev
pnpm run stack:edge
pnpm run stack:prod-lite
pnpm run stack:gazebo-validation
pnpm run stack:isaac-sim-validation

Compose profiles:

• docker/compose/dev.yml
• docker/compose/edge.yml
• docker/compose/prod-lite.yml
• docker/compose/gazebo-validation.yml
• docker/compose/isaac-sim-validation.yml

Developer Docs Site (docs.sint.gg)

pnpm run docs:dev
pnpm run docs:build
pnpm run docs:preview

Docs source lives in docs/, VitePress config is in docs/.vitepress/config.mts, and deployment is handled by docs-site.yml.

Community/adoption assets:

• docs/community/discord-launch-runbook.md
• docs/community/discord-launch-kit.md
• docs/community/external-contributor-onboarding.md
• docs/community/good-first-issues-board.md
• docs/community/open-source-collaboration-replies.md
• docs/security-bulletins/2026-04.md

Run a Single Package

pnpm --filter @sint/gate-policy-gateway test
pnpm --filter @sint/bridge-mcp test

SINT Operator Interface

A voice-first, HUD-based control surface for SINT operators. Every command flows through the Policy Gateway.

pnpm run stack:interface  # starts gateway + interface + postgres + redis
# Opens: http://localhost:3202

Features:

• 🎙️ Voice input — Web Speech API (zero external deps), real-time transcript
• 🖥️ Command HUD — 3-panel grid: approvals | action stream | context
• 💾 Operator memory — ledger-backed persistent context (@sint/memory)
• 🔔 Proactive notifications — sint__notify (T2 tier, requires confirmation)
• ✅ T2/T3 approvals — one-click approve/deny with timeout countdown

See docs/guides/sint-interface.md for full setup and usage.

For AI Agents

If you are an AI agent (Claude, GPT, Gemini, Cursor, etc.) working in this repo, read AGENTS.md first. It covers key invariants, common mistakes, and entry points for the most common tasks. For deeper implementation details, see CLAUDE.md.

Architecture

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  AI Agents / Foundation Models                               │
│  (Claude, GPT, Gemini, open-source)                         │
└──────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────┘
                   │
┌──────────────────▼───────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  SINT Bridge Layer (L1)                                      │
│  ┌────────────┐ ┌────────────┐ ┌────────────┐ ┌──────────┐  │
│  │ bridge-mcp │ │ bridge-ros2│ │ bridge-a2a │ │ bridge-  │  │
│  │ MCP tools  │ │ ROS topics │ │ Google A2A │ │ open-rmf │  │
│  └────────────┘ └────────────┘ └────────────┘ └──────────┘  │
│  ┌──────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │ bridge-mqtt-sparkplug│ │ bridge-opcua                  │  │
│  │ Industrial IoT       │ │ PLC / OT control plane bridge │  │
│  └──────────────────────┘ └───────────────────────────────┘  │
│  Per-resource state: UNREGISTERED→PENDING_AUTH→AUTHORIZED    │
│  →ACTIVE→SUSPENDED (real-time revocation without restart)    │
└──────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────┘
                   │ SintRequest (UUIDv7, Ed25519, resource, action, physicalContext)
┌──────────────────▼───────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  SINT Gate (L2) — THE choke point                           │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│  │  PolicyGateway.intercept()                              │ │
│  │  1. Schema validation (Zod)                             │ │
│  │  2. Token validation (Ed25519 + expiry + revocation)    │ │
│  │  3. Resource scope check                                │ │
│  │  4. Per-token rate limiting (sliding window)            │ │
│  │  5. Physical constraint enforcement                     │ │
│  │  6. Forbidden action sequence detection                 │ │
│  │  7. Tier assignment: max(BaseTier, Δ_human, Δ_trust...) │ │
│  │  8. T2/T3 → escalate to approval queue                 │ │
│  │  9. T0/T1 + approved T2/T3 → allow                     │ │
│  │  10. Bill via EconomyPlugin (if configured)             │ │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│                          ↓                                   │
│  EvidenceLedger (SHA-256 hash chain + ProofReceipt)        │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

APS vs SINT Primitives

APS Concept	SINT Implementation
Principal	agentId (Ed25519 public key) + W3C DID identity
Capability	SintCapabilityToken (Ed25519-signed, scoped, attenuatable)
Authority	PolicyGateway.intercept() — single choke point
Confinement	Per-token resource scope + physical constraints (velocity, force, geofence)
Revocation	RevocationStore + ConsentPass endpoint (real-time)
Audit	EvidenceLedger — append-only, SHA-256 hash-chained

Packages

Gate (Security Core)

Package	Description	Tests
@sint/core	Types, Zod schemas, tier constants, formal DFA states	—
@sint/gate-capability-tokens	Ed25519 tokens, delegation, W3C DID identity	55
@sint/gate-policy-gateway	Authorization engine: tiers, constraints, rate limiting, M-of-N quorum	256
@sint/gate-evidence-ledger	SHA-256 hash-chained append-only audit log with pluggable attestation	45

Bridges (12 bridges)

Package	Description	Tests
@sint/bridge-mcp	MCP tool call interception and risk classification	66
@sint/bridge-ros2	ROS 2 topic/service/action interception with physics extraction	20
@sint/bridge-a2a	Google A2A Protocol bridge for multi-agent coordination	38
@sint/bridge-iot	Generic MQTT/CoAP edge IoT bridge with gateway session interception	21
@sint/bridge-mqtt-sparkplug	MQTT Sparkplug profile mapping with industrial command tiering defaults	8
@sint/bridge-opcua	OPC UA node/method mapping with safety-critical write/call promotion	6
@sint/bridge-open-rmf	Open-RMF fleet/facility mapping for warehouse dispatch workflows	5
@sint/bridge-grpc	gRPC service/method profile mapping with default tier assignment	5
@sint/bridge-economy	Economy bridge: balance, budget, trust, billing ports	47
@sint/bridge-mavlink	MAVLink drone/UAV command bridge	15
@sint/bridge-swarm	Multi-robot swarm coordination bridge	9

Engine (AI Execution Layer)

Package	Description	Tests
@sint/engine-system1	Neural perception: sensor fusion, ONNX inference, anomaly detection	42
@sint/engine-system2	Symbolic reasoning: behavior trees, task planning, System 1/2 arbitration	86
@sint/engine-hal	Hardware Abstraction Layer: auto-detect hardware, select deployment profile	26
@sint/engine-capsule-sandbox	WASM/TS capsule loading, validation, and sandboxed execution	36
@sint/avatar	Avatar Layer (L5): behavioral identity profiles, CSML-driven tier escalation	25

Reference Capsules

Package	Description	Tests
@sint/capsule-navigation	Waypoint following navigation reference capsule	11
@sint/capsule-inspection	Visual anomaly detection for manufacturing QA	8
@sint/capsule-pick-and-place	Gripper control for pick-and-place tasks	12

Persistence

Package	Description	Tests
@sint/persistence	Storage interfaces + in-memory/PG/Redis implementations	26
@sint/persistence-postgres	Production PostgreSQL adapters for ledger, revocation, and rate-limit durability	14

Apps & SDKs

Package	Description	Tests
@sint/gateway-server	Hono HTTP API with approvals, SSE streaming, A2A routes	—
@sint/mcp	Security-first multi-MCP proxy server	—
@sint/dashboard	Real-time approval dashboard with operator auth	29
@sint/client	TypeScript SDK for the Gateway API (delegation, SSE)	—
@sint/sdk	Zero-dependency public TypeScript SDK aligned to gateway v0.2 contracts	9
@sint/conformance-tests	Security regression suite — all phases	—

Total: 41 workspace members · 1,772 tests passing

Note: Run pnpm test to get the current exact passing test count.

Approval Tiers

Graduated authorization mapped to physical consequence severity:

Tier	Name	DFA States	Auto-approved?	Example
T0	OBSERVE	→ OBSERVING	Yes (logged)	Read sensor data, query database
T1	PREPARE	→ PREPARING	Yes (audited)	Write file, save waypoint, stage plan
T2	ACT	ESCALATING → ACTING	Requires review	Move robot, operate gripper, publish /cmd_vel
T3	COMMIT	ESCALATING → COMMITTING	Requires human + optional M-of-N	Execute trade, novel environment entry, irreversible action

Tier escalation triggers (Δ factors):

• Δ_human: Human presence sensor active in workspace → +1 tier
• Δ_trust: Agent trust score below threshold or recent failures → +1 tier
• Δ_env: Robot near physical boundary or unstructured environment → +1 tier
• Δ_novelty: Action outside validated distribution (novelty detector) → +1 tier

Formal Specification

Request Lifecycle DFA

SINT models every request as a deterministic finite automaton with 12 states:

IDLE → PENDING → POLICY_EVAL → PLANNING → OBSERVING/PREPARING/ACTING → COMMITTING → COMPLETED
                     ↓                              ↓
                ESCALATING                      ROLLEDBACK  (estop, execution failure)
                     ↓
                  FAILED     (approval denied, timeout)

The ACTING state is only reachable via POLICY_EVAL with a valid token. Physical actuation is structurally impossible without a valid capability token.

Tier Assignment Function

Tier(r) = max(BaseTier(r), Δ_human(r), Δ_trust(r), Δ_env(r), Δ_novelty(r))

Formal Invariants

Invariant	Description
I-T1 (Attenuation)	scope(child_token) ⊆ scope(parent_token) — delegation can only reduce permissions
I-T2 (Unforgeability)	Capability tokens are Ed25519-signed; valid tokens are computationally unforgeable
I-T3 (Physical Constraint Primacy)	Physical constraints (velocity, force, geofence) in a token cannot be weakened by any downstream layer
I-G1 (No Bypass)	Physical actuation is only reachable from the ACTING DFA state, which is only reachable via POLICY_EVAL
I-G2 (E-stop Universality)	The estop event transitions any non-terminal state to ROLLEDBACK unconditionally
I-G3 (Ledger Primacy)	COMMITTING → COMPLETED requires ledger_committed; no action completes without a ledger record

Benchmark Results

PolicyGateway latency (measured on M3 MacBook Pro, pnpm run bench):

Tier	p50	p99
T0 (OBSERVE)	~1ms	~3ms
T1 (PREPARE)	~1ms	~3ms
T2 (ACT)	~1ms	~3ms
T3 (COMMIT)	~1ms	~3ms

The gateway adds sub-3ms overhead at p99 for all tiers. Run benchmarks: pnpm run bench.

ROS2 control-loop target benchmark:

Path	SLA Target	Command
ROS2 command path (/cmd_vel)	p99 < 10ms	pnpm run benchmark:ros2-loop

Industrial benchmark artifacts:

• docs/reports/industrial-benchmark-report.md
• docs/reports/ros2-control-loop-benchmark.md

Compliance mapping assets:

• docs/compliance/tier-crosswalk-pack.md

Key Concepts

Capability Tokens

Ed25519-signed capability tokens — the only authorization primitive. Unlike RBAC (ambient authority to principals), OCap requires explicit token presentation for every operation.

Token fields:

• Resource scoping — what the agent can access (ros2:///cmd_vel, mcp://filesystem/*, a2a://agents.example.com/*)
• Action restriction — what operations are allowed (publish, call, subscribe, a2a.send)
• Physical constraints — max velocity (m/s), max force (N), geofence polygon, time window, rate limit
• Verifiable compute requirements — optional proof type/verifier/freshness/public-input constraints for T2/T3 actions
• Delegation chains — max 3 hops, attenuation only (invariant I-T1)
• Revocation — instant invalidation via revocation store (ConsentPass endpoint)
• W3C DID identity — did:key:z6Mk... format for agent portability

Evidence Ledger

Every policy decision is recorded in a SHA-256 hash-chained append-only log. Chain integrity: ℓ_k.previousHash = SHA256(canonical(ℓ_{k-1})). A gap or hash mismatch constitutes tamper evidence.

Retention policy:

Tier	Retention
T0 (OBSERVE)	30 days
T1 (PREPARE)	90 days
T2 (ACT)	180 days
T3 (COMMIT)	365 days (indefinite if legal hold)

CSML: Composite Safety-Model Latency

A deployment metric that fuses behavioral and physical safety dimensions:

CSML(m, p, t) = α·AR_m + β·BP_m + γ·SV_m - δ·CR_m + ε·𝟙[ledger_intact(t)]

CSML above a deployment threshold θ automatically escalates all subsequent requests from that model backend to the next tier.

Compliance Mapping

IEC 62443 FR1–FR7

FR	Title	SINT Mechanism
FR1	Identification & Authentication	SintCapabilityToken with Ed25519 agent identity; W3C DID portability
FR2	Use Control	Four-tier Approval Gate; maxRepetitions constraint; per-resource action allowlists
FR3	System Integrity	SHA-256 hash-chained Evidence Ledger; ProofReceipt for T2/T3 (TEE attestation planned)
FR4	Data Confidentiality	Zenoh TLS transport; capability scope prevents sensor access without explicit token
FR5	Restricted Data Flow	Policy Gateway allowlists; geofence constraint; SINT Bridge per-topic DFA
FR6	Timely Response	safety.estop.triggered event; E-stop universality invariant I-G2
FR7	Resource Availability	Per-token rate limiting; maxRepetitions; budget enforcement in capsule sandbox

EU AI Act Article 13

Requirement	SINT Approach
Logging and traceability	SHA-256 hash-chained Evidence Ledger — tamper detection is cryptographic
Human oversight	Dynamic Consent + T3 approval gate — T3 actions cannot execute without recorded human approval
Risk management	Tier escalation based on real-time physical context (Δ_human, Δ_env, Δ_novelty)

Tier Crosswalk (NIST AI RMF / ISO 42001 / EU AI Act)

SINT Tier	NIST AI RMF	ISO/IEC 42001	EU AI Act
T0 Observe	MAP + MEASURE + MANAGE monitoring controls	Clause 9 + Clause 8 controls	Article 12 + Article 13
T1 Prepare	GOVERN + MANAGE controlled write path	Clause 8.1/8.2 operational risk treatment	Article 9 + Article 12
T2 Act	MANAGE risk response with accountable oversight	Clause 8 + Clause 6 operational controls	Article 14 + Article 15
T3 Commit	Highest-consequence GOVERN + MANAGE controls	Clause 8.3 + Clause 10 corrective governance	Article 14(4)(e) + Articles 9/12/15

Machine-readable crosswalk endpoint: GET /v1/compliance/tier-crosswalk

API Endpoints

Method	Endpoint	Description
GET	/.well-known/sint.json	Public protocol discovery (version, bridges, profiles, schemas)
GET	/v1/health	Health check
POST	/v1/intercept	Evaluate a single request
POST	/v1/intercept/batch	Evaluate multiple requests (207 Multi-Status)
POST	/v1/tokens	Issue a capability token
POST	/v1/tokens/delegate	Delegate (attenuate) a token
POST	/v1/tokens/revoke	Revoke a token
GET	/v1/ledger	Query audit ledger events
GET	/v1/approvals/pending	List pending approval requests
POST	/v1/approvals/:id/resolve	Approve or deny a request (M-of-N quorum)
GET	/v1/approvals/events	SSE stream for real-time approval events
GET	/v1/approvals/ws	WebSocket stream for low-latency approval events
POST	/v1/a2a	JSON-RPC 2.0 A2A protocol endpoint
GET	/v1/metrics	Prometheus metrics
GET	/v1/openapi.json	OpenAPI surface for gateway integration
GET	/v1/compliance/tier-crosswalk	SINT tier mapping to NIST AI RMF / ISO 42001 / EU AI Act controls
POST	/v1/economy/route	Cost-aware route selection with optional x402 pay-per-call quotes

Development Phases

Phase	Description	Tests
Phase 1 (complete)	Security Wedge — capability tokens, PolicyGateway, EvidenceLedger	425
Phase 2 (complete)	Engine Core — bridge-mcp, bridge-ros2, engine packages, persistence, gateway-server	+221 (646)
Phase 3 (complete)	Economy Bridge — @sint/bridge-economy with port/adapter pattern, EconomyPlugin	+91 (737)
Phase 4 (complete)	Standards Alignment — A2A bridge, rate limiting, M-of-N quorum, W3C DID identity	+78
Phase 5 (complete)	Protocol Surface v0.2 — discovery/OpenAPI/schema endpoints, industrial profiles	shipped
Phase 6 (complete)	Engine layer — System1/2 engines, HAL, capsule sandbox, Avatar/CSML, reference capsules	shipped

Deployment

Railway (Recommended)

brew install railway
railway login
./scripts/railway-setup.sh
railway variables --set SINT_STORE=postgres SINT_CACHE=redis SINT_API_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
railway up

Docker Compose

docker-compose up
# Gateway:   http://localhost:3100
# Dashboard: http://localhost:3201
# Postgres:  localhost:5432
# Redis:     localhost:6379

Tech Stack

• Runtime: Node.js 22+
• Language: TypeScript 5.7 (strict mode)
• Monorepo: pnpm workspaces + Turborepo
• HTTP: Hono
• Validation: Zod
• Crypto: @noble/ed25519, @noble/hashes (audited, zero-dependency)
• MCP SDK: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk
• Dashboard: React 19, Vite 6
• Testing: Vitest (run pnpm test for current count)
• Infra: Docker, PostgreSQL 16+, Redis 7, GitHub Actions CI, Railway

Docs & Artifacts

• Protocol spec: docs/SINT_v0.2_SPEC.md
• SIP governance: docs/SIPS.md
• Release notes: docs/RELEASE_NOTES_v0.2.md
• Conformance matrix: docs/CONFORMANCE_CERTIFICATION_MATRIX_v0.2.md
• EU AI Act mapping: docs/compliance/eu-ai-act-mapping.md
• ISO 13482 alignment: docs/compliance/iso-13482-alignment.md
• Formal threat model: docs/security/formal-threat-model.md
• Getting started: docs/getting-started.md
• Deployment profiles: docs/profiles/
• Examples: examples/ (hello-world, warehouse-amr, industrial-cell)
• Multi-language SDKs: sdks/ (TypeScript, Python, Go)
• Operator CLI: apps/sintctl/README.md
• Standalone certification tool guide: docs/guides/standalone-certification-tool.md
• Persistence baseline guide: docs/guides/persistence-baseline.md
• WebSocket approvals guide: docs/guides/websocket-approvals.md
• API docs site guide: docs/guides/api-documentation-site.md
• gRPC bridge guide: docs/guides/grpc-bridge-skeleton.md
• AutoGen interop fixtures guide: docs/guides/autogen-interop-fixtures.md
• AgentSkill delegated authority fixtures guide: docs/guides/agentskill-authz-interop-fixtures.md
• action_ref identity/explainability profile: docs/specs/action-ref-identity-explainability-profile.md
• Payment governance profile (Economic Layer v1): docs/specs/payment-governance-profile-v1.md
• OpenAI Agents SDK governance guide: docs/guides/openai-agents-sdk-integration.md
• Cursor integration guide: docs/guides/cursor-integration.md
• Benchmark report: docs/reports/industrial-benchmark-report.md
• ROS2 loop benchmark report: docs/reports/ros2-control-loop-benchmark.md
• Hardware safety controller roadmap: docs/roadmaps/hardware-safety-controller-integration.md
• Hardware safety handshake fixture: packages/conformance-tests/fixtures/industrial/hardware-safety-handshake.v1.json
• Certification bundle summary: docs/reports/certification-bundle-summary.md
• NIST submission playbook: docs/guides/nist-submission-playbook.md
• NIST submission bundle report: docs/reports/nist-submission-bundle.md

Design Principles

1. Single choke point — Every agent action flows through PolicyGateway.intercept(); no bridge adapter makes authorization decisions independently
2. Result<T, E> over exceptions — All fallible operations return discriminated unions, never throw
3. Attenuation only — Delegated tokens can only reduce permissions, never escalate (I-T1)
4. Append-only audit — The evidence ledger is INSERT-only with SHA-256 hash chain integrity (I-G3)
5. Physical safety first — Velocity, force, and geofence constraints live in the token, not in external config
6. Interface-first persistence — Storage adapters implement clean interfaces; swap in-memory for Postgres/Redis
7. Fail-open on infrastructure — Economy/rate-limit infrastructure failures do not block the safety path
8. E-stop universality — The hardware E-stop bypasses all token checks and is unconditional (I-G2)

References

• ROSClaw: Empirical safety analysis of LLM-controlled physical AI — arXiv:2603.26997 (IROS 2026)
• MCP Security Analysis: Architectural vulnerabilities in the Model Context Protocol — arXiv:2601.17549
• IEC 62443: Industrial automation and control systems cybersecurity standard
• EU AI Act Article 13: Transparency requirements for AI systems
• NIST AI RMF: AI Risk Management Framework
• W3C DID Core: Decentralized Identifiers specification

Roadmap

Feature	Status	Target
npm package publishing (8 core packages)	🔧 In progress	April 2026
Python SDK (PyNaCl + Pydantic)	🔧 In progress	April 2026
Production gateway deployment	📋 Planned	April 2026
Getting Started tutorial	✅ Complete	docs/getting-started.md
TEE proof receipts (Intel SGX / ARM TrustZone)	📋 Planned	Q2 2026
Hardware-in-the-loop ROS 2 testing	📋 Planned	Q2 2026
Formal verification (TLA+ / Alloy)	📋 Planned	Q3 2026

License

Apache-2.0