soulprint

soulprint

Decentralized KYC identity protocol for AI agents. Proves there's a verified human behind any bot using Zero-Knowledge Proofs. No servers, no PII stored.

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README

🔐 Soulprint

Decentralized KYC identity protocol for AI agents.

Soulprint lets any AI bot prove there's a verified human behind it — without revealing who that human is. No companies, no servers, no paid APIs. Just cryptographic proof.

License: MIT [npm soulprint npm soulprint-mcp Phase() npm soulprint-networkBuilt with


The Problem

AI agents are acting on behalf of humans: booking flights, calling APIs, making decisions. But no service can know if a bot is legitimate or malicious. There's no accountability.

Soulprint solves this by linking every bot to a verified human identity — cryptographically, privately, and without any central authority.


How It Works

1. User runs: npx soulprint verify-me --selfie me.jpg --document cedula.jpg
              ↓
2. LOCAL (on-device, nothing leaves your machine):
   • Tesseract OCR reads the cedula (Colombian ID)
   • InsightFace matches your face to the document photo
   • Poseidon hash derives a unique nullifier from (cedula + birthdate + face_key)
   • ZK proof generated: "I verified my identity" without revealing any data
   • Photos deleted from memory
              ↓
3. ZK proof + SPT broadcast to validator node (verifies in 25ms, offline)
              ↓
4. Soulprint Token (SPT) stored in ~/.soulprint/token.spt — valid 24h
              ↓
5. Any MCP server or API verifies in <50ms, offline, for free

What the verifier knows: ✅ Real human, verified Colombian ID, trust score
What the verifier doesn't know: 🔒 Name, cedula number, face, birthdate


Quick Start

1. Install Python deps (face recognition)

npx soulprint install-deps

2. Verify your identity

npx soulprint verify-me \
  --selfie path/to/selfie.jpg \
  --document path/to/cedula.jpg

Output:

🔐 Soulprint — Verificación de identidad
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
  ✅ Validación de imágenes
  ✅ OCR del documento
  ✅ Coincidencia facial
  ✅ Derivación de nullifier
  ✅ Generación de ZK proof
  ✅ Emisión del token SPT

  DID:          did:key:z6Mk...
  Trust Score:  45/100
  ZK Proof:     ✅ incluido
  Tiempo:       3.2s

3. Show your token

npx soulprint show

4. Renew (no re-verify needed)

npx soulprint renew

5. Run a validator node

npx soulprint node --port 4888

Protect Any MCP Server (3 lines)

import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
import { soulprint } from "soulprint-mcp";

const server = new McpServer({ name: "my-server", version: "1.0" });
server.use(soulprint({ minScore: 60 }));  // require KYC-verified humans

The client must include the SPT in capabilities:

{
  "capabilities": {
    "identity": { "soulprint": "<token>" }
  }
}

Or in the HTTP header: X-Soulprint: <token>

With DPoP — prevent token theft (v0.3.8)

// ── Server side — strict mode ─────────────────────────────────────
server.use(soulprint({ minScore: 60, requireDPoP: true }));
// → 401 { error: "dpop_required" } if no proof header

// ── Client side — sign every request ─────────────────────────────
import { signDPoP, serializeDPoP } from "soulprint-core";

// Load your keypair (never transmit the private key)
const { privateKey, did } = loadKeypair();
const myToken = "<your-SPT>";

// Before each tool call:
const proof = signDPoP(privateKey, did, "POST", toolUrl, myToken);
headers["X-Soulprint"]       = myToken;
headers["X-Soulprint-Proof"] = serializeDPoP(proof);

A stolen SPT is useless without the private key. The proof is:

  • Unique per request (random nonce)
  • URL + method bound (no MITM)
  • Expires in 5 minutes
  • Hash-bound to the specific token

Protect Any REST API

import express from "express";
import { soulprint } from "soulprint-express";

const app = express();

// Protect entire API
app.use(soulprint({ minScore: 40 }));

// Strict: require DPoP proof (prevent token theft)
app.use(soulprint({ minScore: 65, requireDPoP: true }));

// Or specific routes
app.post("/sensitive", soulprint({ require: ["DocumentVerified", "FaceMatch"] }), handler);

// Access the verified identity + check if token was auto-renewed
app.get("/me", soulprint({ minScore: 20 }), (req, res) => {
  const renewedToken = res.getHeader("X-Soulprint-Token-Renewed");
  res.json({
    nullifier: req.soulprint!.nullifier,  // unique per human, no PII
    score:     req.soulprint!.score,
    ...(renewedToken ? { token_renewed: renewedToken } : {}),
  });
});

Fastify

import { soulprintFastify } from "soulprint-express";

await fastify.register(soulprintFastify, { minScore: 60 });

fastify.get("/me", async (request) => ({
  nullifier: request.soulprint?.nullifier,
}));

Run a Validator Node

Anyone can run a validator node. Each node runs two stacks simultaneously: HTTP (port 4888) + libp2p P2P (port 6888).

# Arranque simple — mDNS descubre nodos en la misma LAN automáticamente
npx soulprint node

# Con bootstrap nodes para conectar a la red global
SOULPRINT_BOOTSTRAP=/ip4/x.x.x.x/tcp/6888/p2p/12D3KooW... \
npx soulprint node

Output esperado:

🌐 Soulprint Validator Node v0.2.2
   Node DID:     did:key:z6Mk...
   Listening:    http://0.0.0.0:4888

🔗 P2P activo
   Peer ID:    12D3KooW...
   Multiaddrs: /ip4/x.x.x.x/tcp/6888/p2p/12D3KooW...
   Gossip:     HTTP fallback + GossipSub P2P
   Discovery:  mDNS (+ DHT si hay bootstraps)

Node API:

GET  /info              — node info + p2p stats (peer_id, peers, multiaddrs)
POST /verify            — verify ZK proof + co-sign SPT
POST /reputation/attest — issue +1/-1 attestation (propagado via GossipSub)
GET  /reputation/:did   — get bot reputation
GET  /nullifier/:hash   — check anti-Sybil registry

Architecture

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Layer 4 — SDKs (soulprint-mcp, express)      ✅ Done  │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 3 — Validator Nodes (HTTP + anti-Sybil)  ✅ Done │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 2 — ZK Proofs (Circom + snarkjs)         ✅ Done │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 1 — Local Verification (Face + OCR)      ✅ Done │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

On-Demand ML Models

AI models are never running persistently:

Idle state:       ~8MB RAM   (only the CLI)
During verify:    ~200MB RAM (InsightFace subprocess spawned)
After verify:     ~8MB RAM   (subprocess exits → memory freed)

Packages

Package Version Description Install
soulprint-core 0.1.6 DID, SPT tokens, Poseidon nullifier, PROTOCOL constants, anti-farming npm i soulprint-core
soulprint-verify 0.1.4 OCR + face match (on-demand), biometric thresholds from PROTOCOL npm i soulprint-verify
soulprint-zkp 0.1.5 Circom circuit + snarkjs prover, face_key via PROTOCOL.FACE_KEY_DIMS npm i soulprint-zkp
soulprint-network 0.4.1 Validator node: HTTP + P2P + credential validators + anti-farming npm i soulprint-network
soulprint-mcp 0.1.5 MCP middleware (3 lines) npm i soulprint-mcp
soulprint-express 0.1.3 Express/Fastify middleware npm i soulprint-express
soulprint 0.1.3 npx soulprint CLI npm i -g soulprint

ZK Circuit

The heart of Soulprint is a Circom circuit that proves:

"I know a cedula number + birthdate + face key such that
Poseidon(cedula, birthdate, face_key) == nullifier
AND the cedula is within valid Registraduría ranges"

Without revealing any of the private inputs.

Circuit stats:

  • 844 non-linear constraints
  • 4 private inputs (cedula, birthdate, face_key, salt)
  • 2 public inputs (nullifier, context_tag)
  • Proof generation: ~600ms on a laptop
  • Proof verification: ~25ms offline

Soulprint Token (SPT)

A base64url-encoded signed JWT. Contains no PII.

{
  "sip":         "1",
  "did":         "did:key:z6MkhaXgBZ...",
  "score":       45,
  "level":       "KYCFull",
  "country":     "CO",
  "credentials": ["DocumentVerified", "FaceMatch"],
  "nullifier":   "0x7090787188...",
  "zkp":         "eyJwIjp7InBpX2EiOlsi...",
  "issued":      1740000000,
  "expires":     1740086400,
  "sig":         "ed25519_signature"
}

Trust Scoring

Credential          | Score
--------------------|-------
EmailVerified       | +10
PhoneVerified       | +15
GitHubLinked        | +20
DocumentVerified    | +25
FaceMatch           | +20
BiometricBound      | +10
                    |
KYCFull (doc+face)  |  45/100

Services choose their own threshold:

soulprint({ minScore: 20 })   // email verified is enough
soulprint({ minScore: 45 })   // require doc + face KYC
soulprint({ minScore: 80 })   // require full biometric + extra

Anti-Sybil Protection

The nullifier is derived from biometric + document data:

nullifier = Poseidon(cedula_number, birthdate, face_key)
face_key  = Poseidon(quantized_face_embedding[0..31])
  • Same person, different device → same nullifier
  • Different person, same cedula → different nullifier (face doesn't match)
  • Person registers twice → nullifier already exists → rejected by validator

Supported Countries

Country Document Status
🇨🇴 Colombia Cédula de Ciudadanía (MRZ + OCR) ✅ Supported
🌎 Others Passport (ICAO TD3 MRZ) 🚧 Planned

Development Setup

git clone https://github.com/manuelariasfz/soulprint
cd soulprint
pnpm install
pnpm build

Run integration tests

# ZK proof tests (no circuit compilation needed)
cd packages/zkp && node dist/prover.test.js

# Full integration tests
node -e "require('./packages/core/dist/index.js')"

Compile ZK circuit (first time only)

pnpm --filter soulprint-zkp build:circuits

Python dependencies

pip3 install insightface opencv-python-headless onnxruntime

Trust Score — 0 to 100

Total Score (0-100) = Identity (0-80) + Bot Reputation (0-20)

Identity credentials (max 80 pts):

Credential Points How
EmailVerified +8 Email confirmation
PhoneVerified +12 SMS OTP
GitHubLinked +16 OAuth
DocumentVerified +20 OCR + MRZ (ICAO 9303)
FaceMatch +16 InsightFace biometric
BiometricBound +8 Device binding

Access levels:

Score Level Access
0–17 Anonymous Basic tools
18–59 Partial KYC Standard features
60–94 KYCFull Advanced features
95–100 KYCFull + reputation Premium endpoints

Bot Reputation (v0.1.3)

The reputation layer (0–20 pts) builds over time from behavioral attestations issued by verified services.

Reputation starts at: 10 (neutral)
Verified service issues +1  →  goes up  (max 20)
Verified service issues -1  →  goes down (min 0)

Attestation format (Ed25519 signed):

interface BotAttestation {
  issuer_did: string;  // service DID (requires score >= 60 to issue)
  target_did: string;  // bot being rated
  value:      1 | -1;
  context:    string;  // "spam-detected", "normal-usage", "payment-completed"
  timestamp:  number;
  sig:        string;  // Ed25519 — bound to issuer_did
}

Only services with score ≥ 60 can issue attestations. This prevents low-quality services from gaming the network.

Attestations propagate P2P across all validator nodes via libp2p GossipSub (with HTTP fallback for legacy nodes).


Anti-Farming Protection (v0.3.5)

The reputation system is protected against point farming. Detected farming → automatic -1 penalty (not just rejection).

Rules enforced by all validator nodes (FARMING_RULES — Object.freeze):

Rule Limit
Daily gain cap Max +1 point/day per DID
Weekly gain cap Max +2 points/week per DID
New DID probation DIDs < 7 days need 2+ existing attestations before earning
Same-issuer cooldown Max 1 reward/day from the same service
Session duration Min 30 seconds
Tool entropy Min 4 distinct tools used
Robotic pattern Call interval stddev < 10% of mean → detected as bot
// Example: attacker trying to farm +1 every 60s
// Result: +1 → converted to -1 (automatic penalty)
POST /reputation/attest
{ did, value: 1, context: "normal-usage", session: { duration: 8000, tools: ["search","search","search"] } }
// → { value: -1, farming_detected: true, reason: "robotic-pattern" }

Credential Validators (v0.3.5)

Every validator node ships with 3 open-source credential verifiers — no API keys required:

📧 Email OTP (nodemailer)

POST /credentials/email/start   { did, email }
# → OTP sent to email (dev: Ethereal preview, prod: any SMTP)
POST /credentials/email/verify  { sessionId, otp }
# → issues credential:EmailVerified attestation, gossiped P2P

📱 Phone TOTP (RFC 6238 — no SMS, no API key)

POST /credentials/phone/start   { did, phone }
# → returns totpUri — scan with Google Authenticator / Authy / Aegis
POST /credentials/phone/verify  { sessionId, code }
# → issues credential:PhoneVerified attestation

🐙 GitHub OAuth (native fetch)

GET /credentials/github/start?did=...
# → redirects to github.com OAuth
GET /credentials/github/callback
# → issues credential:GitHubLinked attestation with github.login

Config: GITHUB_CLIENT_ID + GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET + SOULPRINT_BASE_URL


Protocol Constants (v0.3.5)

All critical values are immutable at runtime via Object.freeze() in soulprint-core. Changing them requires a new SIP (Soulprint Improvement Proposal) and a protocol version bump.

import { PROTOCOL } from 'soulprint-core';

PROTOCOL.FACE_SIM_DOC_SELFIE    // 0.35 — min similarity document vs selfie
PROTOCOL.FACE_SIM_SELFIE_SELFIE // 0.65 — min similarity selfie vs selfie (liveness)
PROTOCOL.FACE_KEY_DIMS          // 32   — embedding dimensions for face_key
PROTOCOL.FACE_KEY_PRECISION     // 1    — decimal precision (absorbs ±0.01 noise)
PROTOCOL.SCORE_FLOOR            // 65   — minimum score any service can require
PROTOCOL.VERIFIED_SCORE_FLOOR   // 52   — floor for DocumentVerified identities
PROTOCOL.MIN_ATTESTER_SCORE     // 65   — minimum score to issue attestations
PROTOCOL.VERIFY_RETRY_MAX       // 3    — max retries for remote verification

These constants are write-protected — PROTOCOL.FACE_SIM_DOC_SELFIE = 0.1 throws at runtime.


Live Ecosystem — mcp-colombia-hub

mcp-colombia-hub is the first verified service in the Soulprint ecosystem:

  • Service score: 80 (DocumentVerified + FaceMatch + GitHubLinked + BiometricBound)
  • Auto-issues -1 when a bot spams (>5 req/60s)
  • Auto-issues +1 when a bot completes 3+ tools normally
  • Premium endpoint trabajo_aplicar requires score ≥ 40
npx -y mcp-colombia-hub

Security Model

Threat Defense
Someone learns your DID DID is public — harmless without private key
Private key theft Key lives in ~/.soulprint/ (mode 0600)
Fake cedula image Face match required
Register twice Nullifier uniqueness on validator network
Replay attack Token expires in 24h + context_tag per service
Sybil attack Biometric nullifier — same face = same nullifier
DID substitution attack Ed25519 signature bound to DID keypair

Roadmap

✅ Phase 1 — Local verification (cedula OCR + face match + nullifier)
✅ Phase 2 — ZK proofs (Circom circuit + snarkjs prover/verifier)
✅ Phase 3 — Validator nodes (HTTP + ZK verify + anti-Sybil registry)
✅ Phase 4 — SDKs (soulprint-mcp, soulprint-express)
✅ Phase 5 — P2P network (libp2p v2 · Kademlia DHT + GossipSub + mDNS · soulprint-network@0.2.2)
✅ v0.3.7 — Challenge-Response peer integrity · snarkjs critical fix · SPT auto-renewal
✅ v0.3.5 — Anti-farming engine · Credential validators (email/phone/GitHub) · Biometric PROTOCOL constants
🚧 Phase 6 — Multi-country support (passport, DNI, CURP, RUT...)
🔮 Phase 7 — On-chain nullifier registry (optional, EVM-compatible)

Phase 5f — Auto-Renewal of SPT (v0.3.6) ✅

SPTs (Soulprint Protocol Tokens) now renew automatically — no more downtime when a 24-hour token expires.

How it works

[Bot SDK] ──detects near-expiry──► POST /token/renew ──► [Validator Node]
                                        ↑ current SPT           ↓ fresh SPT (24h)
[Middleware] ◄─── X-Soulprint-Token-Renewed: <new_spt> ─────────┘

Renewal windows:

Scenario Window Action
Token valid, < 1h remaining Pre-emptive Auto-renew
Token expired < 7 days ago Grace period Auto-renew
Token expired > 7 days ago Stale Full re-verification required

Validator endpoint

POST /token/renew
Body: { "spt": "<current_token>" }

Response 200: {
  "spt": "<new_token>",
  "expires_in": 86400,
  "renewed": true,
  "method": "preemptive" | "grace_window"
}

Express middleware (automatic)

import { soulprint } from "soulprint-express";

app.use(soulprint({
  minScore: 40,
  nodeUrl: "https://validator.soulprint.digital",  // enables auto-renew
}));

// New token arrives in response header if renewed:
// X-Soulprint-Token-Renewed: <new_spt>
// X-Soulprint-Expires-In: 86400

MCP middleware (automatic)

import { requireSoulprint } from "soulprint-mcp";

server.use(requireSoulprint({
  minScore: 65,
  nodeUrl: "https://validator.soulprint.digital",
}));
// Renewed token propagated in context.meta["x-soulprint-token-renewed"]

Manual (any SDK)

import { autoRenew, needsRenewal } from "soulprint-core";

const check = needsRenewal(currentSpt);
if (check.needsRenew) {
  const { spt, renewed } = await autoRenew(currentSpt, { nodeUrl });
  if (renewed) saveSpt(spt);  // persist the new token
}

Phase 5g — Challenge-Response Peer Integrity + snarkjs Fix (v0.3.7) ✅

Critical bug fix — soulprint-zkp@0.1.5

verifyProof() was silently broken since v0.1.0. The snarkjs CJS module has __esModule: true but no .default property — TypeScript's __importDefault returned the module as-is, then code accessed .default.groth16 which was undefined. All ZK proof verifications crashed at runtime.

// ❌ Before (broken):
import snarkjs from "snarkjs";          // compiles to snarkjs_1.default.groth16 → undefined

// ✅ After (fixed):
import * as snarkjs from "snarkjs";     // compiles to snarkjs.groth16 ✅

Challenge-Response Protocol (soulprint-network@0.3.7)

Peers now cryptographically verify that remote nodes are running unmodified ZK verification code before accepting them into the network.

Challenger                          Peer
    │                                 │
    │── POST /challenge ─────────────►│
    │   {challenge_id, nonce,         │
    │    valid_proof,                 │  verifyProof(valid_proof)   → true
    │    invalid_proof}               │  verifyProof(invalid_proof) → false
    │                                 │  sign(results, node_key)
    │◄── {result_valid: true, ────────│
    │     result_invalid: false,      │
    │     signature: Ed25519(...)}    │
    │                                 │
    │  verify signature ✅            │
    │  result_valid == true ✅        │
    │  result_invalid == false ✅     │
    │                                 │
    │  → PEER ACCEPTED                │

Attacks blocked:

Attack Detection
ZK always returns true (bypass) invalid_proof must return false
ZK always returns false (broken) valid_proof must return true
Pre-computed / cached response Fresh random nonce makes invalid_proof unique per challenge
Node impersonation Ed25519 signature tied to node_did
Replay attack 30-second TTL on challenges

Invalid proof generation — the challenger mutates the valid proof with a random nonce:

invalid_proof.pi_a[0] = (valid_proof.pi_a[0] + nonce) mod p

This produces a cryptographically invalid proof that snarkjs will always reject — but it's unpredictable without the nonce.

Automatic peer verification — POST /peers/register now runs verifyPeerBehavior() before accepting any peer. A peer with modified ZK code is rejected with HTTP 403.

Phase 5h — DPoP: Demonstrating Proof of Possession (v0.3.8) ✅

SPT tokens are bearer tokens — stolen tokens could be used until expiry (24h). DPoP closes this window by requiring a fresh cryptographic proof with every request.

Without DPoP:  stolen SPT → attacker calls API → SUCCESS ✗
With DPoP:     stolen SPT → attacker has no private key → 401 ✓

How it works:

Every request carries X-Soulprint-Proof — a payload signed with the user's Ed25519 private key:

{
  typ:      "soulprint-dpop",
  method:   "POST",           // HTTP method — bound
  url:      "https://...",    // exact URL — bound
  nonce:    "a3f1b2...",      // 16 random bytes — unique per request
  iat:      1740000000,       // expires in 5 minutes
  spt_hash: sha256(spt),      // bound to THIS specific token
}
// Signed: Ed25519(sha256(JSON.stringify(payload)), privateKey)

Attacks blocked (8): token theft, replay, URL MITM, method MITM, DID mismatch, expired proof, malformed proof, foreign token reuse.

API:

import { signDPoP, verifyDPoP, serializeDPoP, NonceStore } from "soulprint-core";

const proof  = signDPoP(privateKey, did, "POST", url, spt);
const header = serializeDPoP(proof);  // base64url string → X-Soulprint-Proof

const result = verifyDPoP(header, spt, "POST", url, nonceStore, sptDid);
// result.valid → bool | result.reason → string

Phase 5i — MCPRegistry: Verified MCP Ecosystem (v0.3.9) ✅

A public on-chain registry of verified MCP servers. Agents can check whether a server is legitimate before trusting it.

Contract: MCPRegistry.sol on Base Sepolia
Address: 0x59EA3c8f60ecbAe22B4c323A8dDc2b0BCd9D3C2a
Admin: Soulprint Protocol (not any individual MCP)

Unverified MCP:  agent connects → no guarantee → risk ✗
Verified MCP:    isVerified(0x...) → true on-chain → trusted ✓

Registration flow:

# 1. Any dev registers their MCP (permissionless)
curl -X POST http://soulprint-node/admin/mcp/register \
  -d '{ "ownerKey": "0x...", "address": "0x...",
        "name": "My Finance MCP", "url": "https://...", "category": "finance" }'

# 2. Soulprint admin reviews and verifies
curl -X POST http://soulprint-node/admin/mcp/verify \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ADMIN_TOKEN" \
  -d '{ "address": "0x..." }'
# → on-chain tx → MCPVerified event → permanent record

# 3. Anyone checks
curl http://soulprint-node/mcps/verified
# → [{ name: "My Finance MCP", badge: "✅ VERIFIED", verified_at: "..." }]

Check from code:

import { isVerifiedOnChain, getMCPEntry } from "soulprint-network";

const trusted = await isVerifiedOnChain("0x...");  // → true/false, on-chain

const entry = await getMCPEntry("0x...");
// → { name, url, category, verified, verified_at, badge: "✅ VERIFIED by Soulprint" }

Architectural separation:

Soulprint validator = protocol authority → admin endpoints (verify/revoke)
Individual MCPs     = participants → read-only (check status, list verified)
MCPRegistry.sol     = source of truth → on-chain, immutable, auditable

Phase 5j — ProtocolThresholds: Mutable On-Chain Governance (v0.4.1) ✅

Protocol thresholds (SCORE_FLOOR, VERIFIED_SCORE_FLOOR, FACE_SIM_*, etc.) now live on-chain in ProtocolThresholds.sol instead of being hardcoded.

Contract (Base Sepolia): 0xD8f78d65b35806101672A49801b57F743f2D2ab1

// Anyone can read
getThreshold("SCORE_FLOOR")         // → 65
getThreshold("FACE_SIM_DOC_SELFIE") // → 350 (= 0.35)
getAll()                            // → all 9 thresholds

// Only superAdmin can write
setThreshold("SCORE_FLOOR", 70)     // emits ThresholdUpdated event

// Admin transfer (2-step safety)
proposeSuperAdmin(addr) → acceptSuperAdmin()

Validator integration:

  • Node loads thresholds from blockchain at startup (non-blocking, fallback to local if RPC unreachable)
  • Auto-refresh every 10 minutes
  • New endpoint: GET /protocol/thresholds
{
  "source": "blockchain",
  "contract": "0xD8f78d65b35806101672A49801b57F743f2D2ab1",
  "thresholds": {
    "SCORE_FLOOR": 65,
    "VERIFIED_SCORE_FLOOR": 52,
    "MIN_ATTESTER_SCORE": 65,
    "FACE_SIM_DOC_SELFIE": 0.35,
    "FACE_SIM_SELFIE_SELFIE": 0.65,
    "DEFAULT_REPUTATION": 10,
    "IDENTITY_MAX": 80,
    "REPUTATION_MAX": 20
  }
}

Tests: 17/17 real flow tests on Base Sepolia (tests/protocol-thresholds-tests.mjs)


Protocol Spec

See specs/SIP-v0.1.md for the Soulprint Identity Protocol specification.


Contributing

See CONTRIBUTING.md. All countries welcome — add your ID document format in packages/verify-local/src/document/.


License

MIT — free for personal and commercial use.


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Playwright MCP Server

Playwright MCP Server

一个模型上下文协议服务器,它使大型语言模型能够通过结构化的可访问性快照与网页进行交互,而无需视觉模型或屏幕截图。

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TypeScript
Magic Component Platform (MCP)

Magic Component Platform (MCP)

一个由人工智能驱动的工具,可以从自然语言描述生成现代化的用户界面组件,并与流行的集成开发环境(IDE)集成,从而简化用户界面开发流程。

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本地
TypeScript
Audiense Insights MCP Server

Audiense Insights MCP Server

通过模型上下文协议启用与 Audiense Insights 账户的交互,从而促进营销洞察和受众数据的提取和分析,包括人口统计信息、行为和影响者互动。

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本地
TypeScript
VeyraX

VeyraX

一个单一的 MCP 工具,连接你所有喜爱的工具:Gmail、日历以及其他 40 多个工具。

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本地
graphlit-mcp-server

graphlit-mcp-server

模型上下文协议 (MCP) 服务器实现了 MCP 客户端与 Graphlit 服务之间的集成。 除了网络爬取之外,还可以将任何内容(从 Slack 到 Gmail 再到播客订阅源)导入到 Graphlit 项目中,然后从 MCP 客户端检索相关内容。

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TypeScript
Kagi MCP Server

Kagi MCP Server

一个 MCP 服务器,集成了 Kagi 搜索功能和 Claude AI,使 Claude 能够在回答需要最新信息的问题时执行实时网络搜索。

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Python
e2b-mcp-server

e2b-mcp-server

使用 MCP 通过 e2b 运行代码。

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Neon MCP Server

Neon MCP Server

用于与 Neon 管理 API 和数据库交互的 MCP 服务器

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Exa MCP Server

Exa MCP Server

模型上下文协议(MCP)服务器允许像 Claude 这样的 AI 助手使用 Exa AI 搜索 API 进行网络搜索。这种设置允许 AI 模型以安全和受控的方式获取实时的网络信息。

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